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Evidence
Evidence of Memory from Brain Data
Emily Murphy1
Introduction
John Henry Wigmore, writing in the 1930s, was optimistic
that the courts would embrace something like a perfect memorydetection device to “detect specifically the memory-failure and the
lie on the witness-stand.”2 Nearly 100 years of scientific
advancement later, it is worth asking: What would it really mean
to be able to detect the contents of a person’s memory? If a brainbased approach were scientifically reliable, would it be admitted
as courtroom evidence? Recent advances in brain imaging
analysis techniques introduce the potential for brain-based
memory detection and offer new information about the nature of
autobiographical memory.
Admissibility in court and the persuasiveness (or prejudicial
effect) of evidence is often the focus of legal analysis of the new
neuroscience technology.3 But the deeper question that this
research presents is this: if the science is sophisticated enough to
demonstrate that accurate, veridical memory detection is limited
by biological, rather than technological, constraints, what should
that understanding mean for broader legal conceptions of how
memory is traditionally assessed and relied upon in legal
proceedings? The use of powerful machine-learning algorithms
reveals the limits of technological capacities to detect true
memories and affirms existing psychological understanding that
all memory is potentially flawed.

1

Excerpted and adapted from Emily R.D. Murphy & Jesse Rissman,
Evidence of Memory from Brain Data, J.L. & BIOSCI. (2020).
2
JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 875 (2d ed. 1935).
3
See, e.g., Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner
Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal
Defendant's Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119 (2010); Lyn M.
Gaudet & Gary E. Marchant, Under the Radar: Neuroimaging Evidence
in the Criminal Courtroom, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 577 (2016).
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Technological Advancements, Biological Limits
Memory detection is distinct from lie detection, or “truth
verification.”4 The existence (or absence) of a memory trace could
theoretically be detected regardless of whether the subject is
affirmatively misrepresenting or concealing that information.5
The forensic appeal of memory detection is based on the
assumption that certain brain activity is less subject to fabrication,
reinterpretation, or concealment than subjective reports or even
than physiological measurements of the body such as skin
conductance, heart rate, breathing rate, and eye movements. This
assumption has been tested by assessing the efficacy of
countermeasures—behavioral or cognitive strategies for “beating
the test” or manipulating results.
But active countermeasures are not the only form of potential
distortion; others come from the innate imperfections of human
memory. Normal people experience spontaneous memory errors
(such as déjà vu) as well as imagined or suggested memory errors
(sometimes called “source confusions”).6 Exactly how, and how
well, the brain distinguishes autobiographical memories from
other memories is unclear. Recent research suggests that the
degree of autobiographical content may make episodic memories
neurobiologically distinguishable.7 Thus, some consider the
problem of accurate forensic memory detection to be one of
technological limitations. But the limitations on memory detection

4

See Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection:
The Urgent Need for Regulation, AM. J.L. MED. 377 (2007).
5
Daniel V. Meegan, Neuroimaging Techniques for Memory Detection:
Scientific, Ethical, and Legal Issues, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS 9 (2008).
6
See Ira E. Hyman Jr. & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Errors in Autobiographical
Memory, 18 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 933, 933–94 (1998); Elizabeth F.
Loftus & Hunter G. Hoffman, Misinformation and Memory: The
Creation of New Memories, 118 J. EXP. PSYCHOL. 100 (1989).
7
Hung-Yu Chen, Adrian W. Wilmore, Steven M. Nelson & Kathleen B.
McDemott, Are There Multiple Kinds of Episodic Memory? An fMRI
Investigation Comparing Autobiographical and Recognition Memory
Tasks, 37 J. NEUROSCI. 2764 (2017); see also Tiffany E. Chow, Andrew
J. Westphal & Jesse Rissman, Multi-voxel Pattern Classification
Differentiates Personally Experienced Event Memories from
Secondhand Event Knowledge, 176 NEUROIMAGE 110 (2018).
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may be biological as well. That is, some limitations on memory
detection may come from the nature of memory itself.
Techniques based on electroencephalography (EEG) can
detect some memories with accuracy exceeding 90%. These
techniques measure brain activity as a subject is presented with a
series of stimuli—typically words, pictures, or sounds. The EEG
can detect the subject brain’s differentiated responses to
unrecognized, recognized, or meaningful stimuli.8 Not all
information is equally well-remembered, however. People often
remember very little about incidental details of real-world
experiences.9 Is this a problem that can be addressed with
technical advances? Or will those advancements simply reveal the
outer bounds of what our memory is capable of?
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) images brain
function. Unlike EEG, fMRI can provide data from the entire
brain, which is useful because memories are encoded and stored
in networks of brain regions. Advanced fMRI studies of memory
detection assess complex network connections and use machinelearning algorithms to recognize subtle patterns in brain
networks.10 One of the algorithms successfully classified the
self/other status of a picture from daily life events 91% of the time
on average—only by looking at the brain data of a person viewing
the picture.11 But, in a study of memory for previously seen or new
faces, while the algorithm proved to be very good at decoding a
participant’s subjective memory state, it was not nearly as good at
8

See J. Peter Rosenfeld, P300 in Detecting Concealed Information, in
MEMORY DETECTION: THEORY AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEALED
INFORMATION TEST 63–64 (Bruno Verschuere, Gershon Ben-Shakhar &
Ewout Meijer eds. 2011).
9
Pranav Misra, Alyssa Marconi, Matthew Peterson & Gabriel Kreiman,
Minimal Memory for Details in Real Life Events, 8 SCI. REP., Article
16,701 (2018).
10
Jesse Rissman, Tiffany E. Chow, Nicco Reggente & Anthony D.
Wagner, Decoding fMRI Signatures of Real-world Autobiographical
Memory Retrieval, 28 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 604, 606–07 (2016)
[hereinafter “Rissman, Decoding”]; Jesse Rissman, Henry T. Greely &
Anthony D. Wagner, Detecting Individual Memories Through the
Neural Decoding of Memory States and Past Experience, 107
PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9849, 9852 (2010) [hereinafter
“Rissman, Detecting”].
11
Rissman et al., Decoding, supra note 10, at 606–07.
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detecting the participant’s objective experiential history.12 In
another study, the algorithm could not tell whether the presence
of crime-related memories had been obtained by way of crime
execution, crime planning, or reading about the crime-relevant
details.13
In short, the biological limitations of memory detection may
be unsurmountable. Even with sophisticated technology able to
detect different types of autobiographical or episodic memory
processes, there may be no way for scanners and algorithms to
distinguish between an objectively false but subjectively believed
memory, or distinguish between someone who has knowledge of,
but did not participate in, a particular event. Those limitations may
represent biological truths rather than technological failures.
Courtroom Admissibility
For lawyers and judges, courtroom admissibility is the sine
qua non for forensic applications of memory-detection
technology.14 Some have argued that brain-based memorydetection technologies are not “lie detection” and should not be
painted with the same brush of unreliability and thus
inadmissibility.15 But “admissibility” is not an inherent quality of
technology, but rather is a complicated legal, factual, and
scientific question in a particular case.
In court, the admissibility of evidence depends upon, among
other things, whether it is relevant to the factual issues presented
in the case. Brain-based memory detection can potentially
determine which memories are autobiographical. It may detect
memories that help prove identity. So memory-detection evidence
may be relevant to establish what happened or who did what. But
12

Rissman et al., Detecting, supra note 10, at 9852–53.
Judith Peth, Tobias Sommer, Martin N. Hebart & Gerhard Vossel,
Memory Detection using fMRI—Does the Encoding Context Matter? 113
NEUROIMAGE 164, 165–66 (2015).
14
See, e.g., John B. Meixner, Jr., Admissibility and Constitutional Issues
of the Concealed Information Test in American Courts: An Update, in
DETECTING CONCEALED INFORMATION AND DECEPTION 405, 406 (J.
Peter Rosenfeld ed. 2018).
15
See John Meixner, Jr., Liar Liar: Jury’s the Trier? The Future of
Neuroscience-Based Credibility Assessment in the Court, 106 NW. U. L.
REV. 1451, 1474–75 (2012).
13
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brain-based technologies cannot, at present, detect past intent or
past mental state.16 Thus, memory-detection evidence is probably
not admissible to prove or disprove mental state and intent, which
are frequently disputed in court.
In terms of mechanics, in the federal system and many states,
the Daubert trilogy of cases and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (or
state analogs) govern the method by which judges must determine
the admissibility of an expert’s testimony. Presently, courts and
commentators agree that brain-based deception-detection
techniques fail to meet the Daubert standard because of their lack
of understood error rates.17 Some commentators nevertheless
argue that tests that detect recognition require a “radically”
different analysis under Daubert.18 This is analytically incorrect.
Like deception detection, the forensic application of memorydetection methods has unknown error rates and lacks “general
acceptance” in the scientific community.19 Moreover, both
deception detection and recognition detection are fundamentally
assessments of witness credibility, as discussed below.
Accordingly, the evidentiary standards should, at present,
continue to exclude expert testimony opining that brain-based
memory detection proves the presence or absence of a particular
memory.
Even if scientific acceptance grows, reliability still will vary
across types of memory being assessed. Memory detection will
work best in situations where a subject has a repeated experience
resulting in a sturdy, non-fragile memory. Base rates in memory
inaccuracies will depend upon the type of memory and the
circumstances of its encoding and retrieval. For example, even just
“imagining an event that might have occurred in someone’s past
can increase confidence or believe that the event actually
occurred, lead individuals to claim that they performed actions
16

See Brown & Murphy, supra note 3.
See, e.g., Daniel D. Langleben & Jane Campbell Moriarty, Using
Brain Imaging for Lie Detection: Where Science, Law, and Policy
Collide, 19 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, L. 222, 231 (2012); United States v.
Semrau, 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012); Mem. Op. & Order at 5–6,
Maryland v. Smith, No. 106589C (Md. Sup. Ct. Oct. 3, 2012); Wilson v.
Corestaff Servs., L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
18
Meixner, supra note 15.
19
Chow et al., supra note 7, at 122.
17
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that they in fact only imagined or result in the production of
specific and detailed false memories of events that never actually
happened.”20 Normal people, describing non-traumatic life events
over successive interviews, show high degrees of variability in
their autobiographical memory.21 The relevant base rates—i.e.,
how often false or inaccurate memories happen in day-to-day
life—are unknown.
The admissibility of brain-based memory detection may be
relaxed if introduced by a criminal defendant. Because criminal
defendants have a constitutional right to compulsory process, to
which evidentiary rules must sometimes yield,22 a defendant may
be able to admit brain-based memory-detection evidence that is
less reliable than what the prosecution would be able to put
forward. The Constitution may impose other potential hurdles on
the prosecution. Whether the output of a memory-detection device
is physical evidence or testimonial evidence for purposes of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments remains unresolved.23 A defendant
could, for example, raise a Confrontation Clause challenge to
memory-detection evidence of a state witness unavailable for
cross-examination at trial.
Memory Detection as Credibility Assessment
Even were brain-based memory-detection evidence admitted
into trial evidence, the jury would have to assign weight to the
evidence, which is fundamentally a measure of the witness’s
20

Daniel L. Schacter & Elizabeth Loftus, Memory and Law: What Can
Cognitive Neuroscience Contribute?, 16 NATURE NEUROSCI. 119, 121
(2013); Joyce W. Lacy & Craig E.L. Stark, The Neuroscience of
Memory: Implications for the Courtroom, 14 NATURE 649 (2013).
21
Stephen J. Anderson, Gillian Cohen & Stephanie Taylor, Rewriting
the Past: Some Factors Affecting the Variability of Personal Memories,
14 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 435 (2000).
22
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284 (1973).
23
See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, A Modest Defense of Mind Reading, 15
YALE J. L. & TECH. 214, 218 (2013); Nita A. Farahany, Incriminating
Thoughts, 64 STAN. L. REV. 351 (2012); Matthew B. Holloway, Note,
One Image, One Thousand Incriminating Words: Images of Brain
Activity and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 27 TEMP. J. SCI.
TECH. & ENVL. L. 141, 144 (2008).
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credibility. Credibility assessment, in the context of evidence law,
means assessing how worthy evidence is of being believed.24
Lying and insincerity are obvious factors, but witness credibility
also includes other testimonial capacities of ambiguity, memory
loss, and misperception.25 Brain-based memory detection
admitted in court via an expert witness should be doublecredibility dependent. That is, the jury must assess the credibility
of the memory itself (that is, witness credibility), and the
credibility of the memory-detection technology (such as imprecise
or ambiguous outputs, incorrect inferences, and any biases of the
expert testifying). 26 This “double credibility” analysis is not
sufficiently scrutinized by existing Daubert and Frye reliability
requirements for expert methods.27
The key point is that, depending upon the situation at hand,
brain-based memory detection may offer little to no probative
value in assessing the accuracy of a witness’s memory. If
memory-detection technology cannot reliably distinguish false
from true memories, then its evidentiary value is limited to
bolstering or undermining witness sincerity—and it is subject to
the same objections as lie-detector tests of impermissibly
impinging upon the role of the jury.28 That is, in many applied
contexts, memory detection is probably indistinguishable from lie
detection—and thus is subject to the same objections regarding
the role of the jury as the ultimate assessor of credibility. The most
advanced scientific and technological work in memory detection
presently suggests that no machine, no matter how sophisticated,
could detect a false but subjectively believed memory. But the use
of brain-based technology and sophisticated machine-learning
algorithms may obscure that fact with the veneer of factual
accuracy. The technological and biological complexity of
sophisticated brain-based memory detection makes it exceedingly

24

Credibility, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defined as
“worthiness of belief”).
25
See, e.g., Edmund Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of
the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1948).
26
Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, 1979 (2017).
27
Id. at 2035.
28
George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575
(1997).
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difficult—perhaps impossible—for mere laypersons to assess
whether, and how much, they should ultimately believe it as fact.
If We Could, Should We?
If we had a “perfect” brain-based memory detector, should we
use it? Decisional accuracy is undoubtedly a crucial value for the
jury system, but “soft” systemic values of “dignity, equity, and
mercy” also play a role.29 As Justice Linde of the Oregon Supreme
Court once wrote: “I doubt that the uneasiness about electrical lie
detectors would disappear even if they were refined to place their
accuracy beyond question. Indeed, I would not be surprised if such
a development would only heighten the sense of unease and the
search for plausible legal objections.”30 Accurate fact
determination may be the dominant value in assessing evidence
that can go to the jury,31 but it is not so dominant to entirely set
aside personhood issues, particularly when biological limitations
may prevent even perfect technology from revealing the truth.
The fundamental value of personhood—as opposed to the
reductionist, objectified readout of one’s brain—is a cornerstone
of procedural justice.32 Personhood values apply not only to
witnesses, but to jurors, in their ability to appreciate the
personhood of a witness whose credibility they must assess.33
Personhood is central to witness credibility, as evidenced by the
history of witness-competency rules and existing doctrine of
impeachment.34 The dark side of the history of credibility
assessment is that social and behavioral status has long been, and
still is in character-based impeachment doctrine, 35 a proxy for
29

Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO L.J. 1245, 1282–90 (2016).
State v. Lyon, 744 P.2d 231, 238 (Or. 1987) (Linde, J., concurring).
31
James R. McCall, The Personhood Argument Against Polygraph
Evidence, Or “Even If the Polygraph Really Works, Will Courts Admit
the Results?,” 49 HASTINGS L.J. 925, 942 (1998).
32
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (revised ed. 2006).
33
Cf. McCall, supra note 31, at 943.
34
Julia Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 152,
161–66 (2017).
35
See id. at 186 (noting that the “link between credibility, reputation, and
criminality drawn in today’s impeachment rules thus continues to reflect
the notion that the indicia of being a bad person, however defined, is also
the indicia of a liar”).
30
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who is worthy of belief, with disproportionate effects on persons
of color and communities without privilege.36 The urge to replace
these troublesome status-based credibility assessments with
reliable and objective lie-detection science is justifiable.37 But if
science-based techniques can only identify subjective
experience—filtered through the impressions and decisions of
whoever is probing the witness’s brain—are we really any closer
to establishing objective truth? Or are we now assessing witness
credibility based on the social status of the expert and her
sophisticated machine?
Conclusion
Courtroom admissibility is a misdirected pursuit of memorydetection technology. At present, its admissibility would be
precluded under Daubert, Frye, or state equivalents, primarily for
lack of known error rates and lack of general acceptance in the
relevant scientific communities. But were it to clear these hurdles,
brain-based memory detection may still not be suitable for
courtroom use. The most advanced brain-based memory-detection
studies suggest that only subjective experiences, rather than
objective truths, may be accessible, rendering memory detection
generally on the same footing as sincerity detection. Further, the
method of acquiring that information requires machine-learning
algorithms that may be opaque or even unexplainable to a jury,
hindering their ability to assess the machine’s (and expert’s)
credibility and assign appropriate weight. And even if the perfect
memory-detection device worked perfectly well, its use as
evidence would risk marginalizing the personhood of witnesses
and thus undermining procedural justice.

36
37

Id. at 189–91.
Id. at 158.
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